Proving verification theorems can be tricky for models with both optimal stopping and state constraints. We pose and solve two alternative models of optimal consumption and investment with an optimal retirement date (optimal stopping) and various wealth constraints (state constraints). The solutions are parametric in closed form up to at most a constant. We prove the verification theorem for the main case with a nonnegative wealth constraint by combining the dynamic programming and Slater condition approaches. One unique feature of the proof is the application of the comparison principle to the differential equation solved by the proposed value function. In addition, we also obtain analytical comparative statics.
1. Introduction. Retirement is one of the most important economic events in a worker's life. This paper contains a rigorous formulation and analysis of several models of life cycle consumption and investment with voluntary or mandatory retirement and with or without a borrowing constraint against future labor income. In these models, optimal consumption jumps at retirement and, if retirement is voluntary, the optimal portfolio choice also jumps at retirement. If retirement is voluntary, the optimal retirement rule gives human capital a negative beta if wages are uncorrelated with the stock market because retirement comes later when the market is down. This leads to aggressive investment in the market, a result that is dampened when borrowing against future labor income is prohibited and may be reversed when wages are positively correlated with market returns. In the companion paper, Dybvig and Liu [1] focus on the economic intuitions for these results. In this paper, we provide rigorous proofs.
The main results in this paper are explicit parametric solutions (up to some constants) with verification theorems and analytical comparative statics. In particular, we combine the dual approach of Pliska [8] , He and Pagès [3] , Karatzas and Shreve [5] and Karatzas and Wang [6] with an analysis of the boundary to obtain a problem we can solve in a parametric form even if no known explicit solution exists in the primal problem. Having an explicit dual solution allows us to derive analytically the impact of parameter changes and, more importantly, allows us to prove a verification theorem showing that the first-order (Bellman equation) solution is a true solution to the choice problem. Compared to the existing literature (e.g., Pliska [8] , Karatzas and Wang [6] ), the no-borrowing constraint against future labor income significantly complicates the derivations and the proof of the verification theorem. The proof is subtle because of (1) the nonconvexity introduced by the retirement decision, (2) the market incompleteness (from the agent's view) caused by the nonnegative wealth constraint, and (3) the technical problems caused by utility unbounded above or below. Two common approaches to proving a verification theorem are the dynamic programming (Fleming-Richel) approach and the separating hyperplane (Slater condition) approach. Both approaches encounter difficulties in our setting so we use a hybrid of the two (a separating hyperplane after retirement and dynamic programming before retirement). The two are combined with optional sampling, where the continuation after retirement is replaced by the known value of the optimal continuation. One of the most challenging tasks for proving a verification theorem for optimal stopping problems is to show that the proposed value function satisfies certain inequality conditions so that it is indeed optimal to stop at the proposed boundaries. One unique feature of our proof is that this is shown indirectly by applying the comparison principle to the differential equations solved by the proposed value function. This indirect method makes the proof simple and elegant. So far as we know, we are the first to use this approach to prove a verification theorem for this type of control problem involving an optimal stopping time.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the formal choice problems used in the paper. Section 3 presents analytical solutions, comparative statics, and proofs. Section 4 closes the paper.
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2. Choice problems. We consider the optimal consumption and investment problem of an investor who can continuously trade a risk-free asset and n risky assets. The risk-free asset pays a constant interest rate of r. The risky asset price vector S t evolves as dS t S t = dt + dZ t where Z t is a standard n dimensional Wiener process; is an n × 1 constant vector and is an n × n invertible constant matrix so that market is complete with no redundant assets; and the division is element by element. The investor also earns labor income y t :
where y 0 is the initial income from working and y and y are constants of appropriate dimensions. The investor can choose to irreversibly retire at any point in time.
The arrival time d of the investor's mortality follows an independent Poisson process with constant intensity . The investor can purchase insurance coverage of B t − W t against mortality, where W t is the financial wealth of the investor at time t so that, if death occurs at t, the investor has a bequest of W t + B t − W t = B t . To receive the insurance coverage B t − W t at the time of mortality, the investor pays the insurer at a rate of B t − W t , i.e., insurance is assumed to be fairly priced at the mortality rate per unit of coverage.
The investor derives utility from intertemporal consumption and bequest. The investor has a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), time additive utility function (2) with a subjective time discount rate :
where > 0 is the relative risk aversion coefficient and = 1, 1 the constant K > 1 indicates preferences for not working in the sense that the marginal utility of consumption is greater after retirement than before retirement, the constant k > 0 measures the intensity of preference for leaving a large bequest, the limit k 1− → 0 implements the special case with no preference for bequest, and R t is the right-continuous and nondecreasing indicator of the retirement status at time t (which is 1 after retirement and 0 before retirement). The state variable R 0− is the retirement status at the beginning of the investment horizon. Define
where
is the effective discount rate for labor income (assumed to be positive) and
is the price of risk. Below are the two choice problems we focus on in this paper.
Problem 1. Given initial wealth W 0 , initial income from working y 0 , and the deterministic time to retirement T with associated retirement indicator function R t = t ≥ T , choose adapted nonnegative consumption c t , adapted portfolio t , and adapted nonnegative bequest B t to maximize expected utility of lifetime consumption and bequest
= 1 corresponds to the log utility case, which can be examined similarly. Most of our results in the paper apply to the log case by taking → 1.
INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s). Additional information, including rights and permission policies, is available at http://journals.informs.org/. the labor income process (1) , and the limited borrowing constraint
where g t y t is the market value at t of the future labor income.
Let ∈ 0 1 denote the type of borrowing constraints, with = 1 for the limited borrowing type and = 0 for the no-borrowing type. Problem 1 corresponds to Problem 1 of Dybvig and Liu [1] , Problem 2 with = 1 corresponds to Problem 2 of Dybvig and Liu [1] , and Problem 2 with = 0 corresponds to Problem 3 of Dybvig and Liu [1] .
Problem 2. Given initial wealth W 0 , initial income from working y 0 , initial retirement status R 0− , and borrowing constraint type ∈ 0 1 , choose adapted nonnegative consumption c t , adapted portfolio t , adapted nonnegative bequest B t , and adapted nondecreasing retirement indicator R t (i.e., a right-continuous nondecreasing process taking values 0 and 1) to maximize the expected utility of lifetime consumption and bequest (2) subject to the budget constraint (6), the labor income process before retirement (1) , and the borrowing constraint
where 1 − R t y t / 1 is the market value at t of the subsequent labor income.
To summarize the differences across the problems, moving from Problem 1 to Problem 2, the fixed retirement date T (R t = t ≥ T ) is replaced by free choice of retirement date (R t , a choice variable) along with a technical change in the calculation of the market value of future labor income g t y t to 1 − R t y t / 1 when = 1. When = 0, then the investor faces a no-borrowing constraint W t ≥ 0 Remark. Because the time of mortality d is independent of the Brownian motion, we have that the objective function
We denote the value functions for Problems 1 and 2 by v W y t and V W y R , respectively. Note that, because both problems become the same after retirement, we have
3. The analytical solution and comparative statics. The general idea of solving Problems 1 and 2 is to perform a change of variables into a dual variable, the marginal utility of consumption. The general advantage of this dual approach (especially for Problem 2) is that it linearizes the nonlinear Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation in the primal problem. This is consistent with the method of Pliska [8] of converting a dynamic budget constraint into a static budget constraint.
Let
For our solutions, we will assume > 0, which is also the condition for the corresponding Merton problem (Merton [7] ) to have a solution because, if < 0, then an investor can achieve infinite utility by delaying consumption. Define the state price density process by
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This is the usual state price density adjusted to be conditional on living, given the mortality rate and fair pricing of long and short positions in term life insurance. Also, define
The solution to Problem 1 can be stated as follows.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose > 0 and that the limited borrowing constraint is satisfied with strict inequality at the initial values
The solution to an investor's Problem 1 can be written in terms of a dual variablex t (a normalized marginal utility of consumption), wherex
Then, the optimal wealth process is
the optimal consumption policy is c *
the optimal trading strategy is * t = y t
y g t and the optimal bequest policy is
Furthermore, the value function for the problem is
Proof. Because Problem 1 can be transformed into a standard dual problem with minor modifications (e.g., Pliska [8] ), we omit the proof here. See Dybvig and Liu [1] for a sketch of the proof using a separating hyperplane to separate preferred consumptions from the feasible consumptions.
Unlike Problem 1, Problem 2 also requires one to solve for the optimal retirement decision. We conjecture that it is optimal to retire when the wealth-to-income ratio is high enough, which corresponds to when a new dual variable x t hits a lower bound x. Then, as in a typical optimal stopping problem, one imposes C 1 condition for the dual value function across x. In the presence of the no-borrowing constraint (i.e., = 0), one also imposes the no-risky-investment condition (i.e., the second derivative of the dual value function is 0) when wealth W t hits 0 (or, equivalently, when x t hits an upper boundx). After obtaining the solutions, we verify that all of our conjectures are indeed correct.
Recall the definitions of in (10) and 1 in (4). Define
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where ∈ 0 1 is the unique solution to q = 0 2 and thus where
Then, the solution to Problem 2 can be stated as follows. 3 > 0 and that the borrowing constraint holds with strict inequality at the initial condition:
The solution to an investor's Problem 2 can be written in terms of a dual variable x t , where 
Then, the optimal consumption policy is
the optimal trading strategy is * t = y t −1
− r1 x t xx x t R * t − y x t xx x t R * t + x x t R * t the optimal bequest policy is
The existence and uniqueness of the solution to q = 0 is shown in Lemma 3.4. 1 > 0 is to ensure the finiteness of the labor income; 2 > 0 is to ensure the finiteness of the expected utility from working and consuming labor income forever; and 3 > 0 is to avoid the degeneration of the dual process x t to a deterministic function of time. The razor edge case where 3 = 0 is less interesting and needs a separate treatment.
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the optimal retirement policy is R * t = t ≥ * the corresponding retirement wealth threshold is
and the optimal wealth is W * t = −y t x x t R * t
Furthermore, the value function is
The investor's problem can be associated with the dual optimal stopping problem, where the investor solves
and the borrowing constraint 
The transformed dual value function x 0 ≡ y −1
x/y y then satisfies a variational inequality
with boundary conditions x x 0 0 = 0 and
Mathematics of Operations Research 36(4), pp. 620-635, © 2011 INFORMS When = 1, Problem 2 can be transformed into one that has been studied by Karatzas and Wang (2000) with minor modifications. 5 Therefore, we will only present the proof for the case with the no-borrowing constraint, i.e., = 0. For notation simplicity, we use V W y R and x R to represent V W y R 0 and x R 0 , respectively. Let
Then, by (27), (33), and (34), we have
The following lemmas are useful for the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose = 0, > 0, 1 > 0, 2 > 0, and 3 > 0. Suppose there exists a solution ∈ 0 1 to Equation (23) (to be shown in Lemma 3.4). Then, (i)ˆ x is strictly convex and strictly decreasing for x ≥ 0 (ii) ∀ x ≤x, we have x ≥ˆ x ; ∀ x ∈ x x , we have x x ≥ˆ x x and
(iii)
x is strictly convex and strictly decreasing for x <x. (v) Given W 0 > 0, there exists a unique solution x 0 > 0 to (25). In addition, W * t defined in (28) satisfies the borrowing constraint (8) .
Proof of Lemma 3.1. (i) > 0 implies that b = 1 − 1/ < 1. Then, because > 0, direct differentiation shows thatˆ x is strictly convex and strictly decreasing for x ≥ 0.
(
It can be easily verified that
and xx x = 0 5 One such transformation is
We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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Then, by (36) and (37), h x must satisfy
By (38)-(40) and the fact thatˆ x is monotonically decreasing for x > 0, we have
Differentiating (41) once, we obtain
We consider two possible cases.
In this case, the right-hand side of Equation (43) (42), and h x > 0 imply that
This implies that h x > 0 by (41) and (42). There exists > 0 such that h x > 0 for any x ∈ x x + because h x = 0. The right-hand side of Equation (43) is monotonically decreasing in x. Let x * be such that the right-hand side of (43) is 0. Then, for any x ≤ x * , the right-hand side is nonnegative and thus h x cannot have any interior nonnegative (local) maximum in x x * for similar reasons to those in Case 1. There cannot exist anyx ∈ x + x * such that h x ≤ 0. If x * <x, then, for any x ∈ x * x , the right-hand side is nonpositive and thus h x cannot have any interior nonpositive (local) minimum in x * x . There cannot exist anyx ∈ x * x such that h x ≤ 0. Therefore, there cannot exist anyx ∈ x x such that h x ≤ 0 and thus we have h x > 0 and h x > 0 for any x ∈ x x . Now, we show, for both cases, that h x > 0 for any x < x. Equation (35) implies that the right-hand side of (41) is positive for x < x and h cannot achieve an interior positive maximum for x < x. On the other hand, h x > 0, h x is continuous at x and h x = 0, which imply that there exists an > 0 such that
Thus, ∀ x ∈ x − x , h x > 0 and, therefore, ∀ x < x, h x > 0; otherwise, h would achieve an interior positive maximum in 0 x . (iii) Recall that = 0. It can be shown that 
which (by the definition (19)) implies that A − < 0. INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
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(iv) Differentiating (33) twice, we have, for x <x,
where the inequality follows from the fact that
This is implied by A − < 0, A + > 0, + > 1 > b > − , and − < 0, and the last equality in (45) follows from xx x = 0. Thus, x is strictly convex ∀ x <x. Because x x = 0 and ∀ x <x, xx x > 0, we must also have ∀ x <x, x x < 0.
(v) By part (i), part (iv), and x x =ˆ x x , x x R is continuous and strictly increasing in x ∈ 0 x . By inspection of (33) and (34), x x R takes on all nonpositive values. Because y 0 > 0, there exists a unique solution x 0 > 0 to (25) for each W 0 > 0. Also, because x x R ≤ 0, (28) implies that W * t ≥ 0 ∀ t ≥ 0 Though the dual approach yields almost explicit solutions, it is simpler to show the optimality of the candidate policies in the primal for this combined optimal stopping and optimal control problem. Define
The following lemma is a generalized dominated convergence theorem that is required for the proof of Lemma 3.3.
Lemma 3.2. Suppose that a.s. convergent sequences of random variables X n → X and Y n → Y satisfy 0 ≤ X n ≤ Y n and E Y n → E Y < . Then, E X n → E X .
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Because 0 ≤ X n ≤ Y n , by Fatou's lemma, liminf E X n ≥ E X and liminf E Y n −X n ≥ E Y −X . These inequalities imply that both limsupE X n ≥ E X and liminf E X n ≤ E X because E Y n → E Y < . Therefore, we must have E X n → E X . Lemma 3.3. Suppose = 0. Given the definitions for Theorem 3.2, (i) M t as defined in (46) is a supermartingale for any feasible policy and a martingale for the claimed optimal policy.
(ii) For any feasible policy, lim t→ E 1−R t e − + t V W t y t 0 ≥ 0 (47) with equality for the claimed optimal policy.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. 1. DefineW = −y x x 0 . Then, for any W ≥ 0,
with equality for W ≥W . This can be shown as follows. Let x and x R be such that −y x x 0 = W and −y x x R 1 = W . Then, we have
where the first inequality follows from x 0 ≥ x 1 by Lemma 3.1 and the second inequality follows from the convexity of x 1 . After rearranging, we obtain (48 (36)- (39), we obtain that the first integral is always nonpositive for any feasible policy c B R and is equal to zero for the claimed optimal policy c * B * * R * . By (48), the third term in (49) is always nonpositive for every feasible retirement policy R t and equal to zero for the claimed optimal policy R * t . In addition, using the expressions for the claimed optimal * t , V , B * t , and W * t , we have that, under the claimed optimal policy, the stochastic integral is a martingale because y t is a geometric Brownian motion; with = 0, x t is bounded between x andx before retirement; and x t is also a geometric Brownian motion after retirement. This shows that M t is a local supermartingale for all feasible policies and a martingale for the claimed optimal policy.
Next, we show that M t is actually a supermartingale for all feasible policies. First, we show that 1− V W y 0 ≥ 0 for every feasible policy. By (29) If < 1, then V W t y t 0 > 0 and the local supermartingale M t is then always nonnegative and thus a supermartingale.
Suppose > 1. By (49), there exists an increasing sequence of stopping times n → such that M 0 ≥ E M n ∧t , i.e.,
Because the integrand in the integral of (50) is always negative, this integral is monotonically decreasing in time. In addition,
is a martingale with E N t = 1, the second inequality follows from V being negative and increasing in W and W t > 0, the equality follows from the form of V as defined by (29) and (30), and the last inequality follows from V 0 1 0 < 0 and 2 > 0. In addition, V 0 1 0 > − . Therefore, taking n → in (50), by the monotone convergence theorem for the first term and Lemma 3.2 for the second term, we have = 0 (53) INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
630
Mathematics of Operations Research 36(4), pp. 620-635, © 2011 INFORMS for some constant L 1 , where the second inequality follows from the fact that when = 0,x t , x t 0 , and x x t 0 are all bounded and R t = 1 for t > * . The last equality in (53) follows from the conditions that > 0 and 2 > 0.
Therefore, for the claimed optimal policy, we obtain lim t→ E 1−R t e − + t V W t y t 0 = 0 For any feasible policy, if < 1, then V W y 0 > 0 and therefore (47) holds. If > 1, because 2 > 0, we have lim t→ E e − + t y t 1− = 0. Therefore, taking the limit as t → in (51), we have that (47) also holds. This completes the proof.
Lemma 3.4. Suppose > 0, 1 > 0, 2 > 0, and 3 > 0. Then, there exists a unique solution * ∈ 0 1 to Equation (23) and
Proof of Lemma 3.4. Because > 0, 1 > 0, 2 > 0, and 3 > 0,
it is easy to verify that
< 1, then we have
Then, by continuity of q, there exists a solution * ∈ 0 ¯ such that q * = 0. Suppose there exists another solutionˆ ∈ 0 1 such that q ˆ = 0. Let V W y 0 andW be the value function and boundary, respectively, corresponding to * and letV W y 0 andŴ be the value function and boundary, respectively, corresponding toˆ . Without loss of generality, supposeW >Ŵ . BecauseŴ is the retirement boundary, the value function corresponding toˆ forW > W >Ŵ is equal to V W y 1 . However, Lemma 3.1 implies that V W y 0 > V W y 1 for any W <W . This implies thatŴ cannot be the optimal retirement boundary, which contradicts Theorem 3.2. Therefore, the solution to Equation (23) is unique.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.2. Proof of Theorem 3.2. If R 0 = 1, then Problem 2 is identical to Problem 1. Therefore, the optimality of the claimed optimal strategy follows from Theorem 3.1. In addition, as noted in (9), we have
where v W y T (independent of T ) is the value function after retirement for Problem 1. From now on, we assume w.l.o.g. that R 0 = 0. It is tedious but straightforward to use the generalized Itô's lemma and Equations (17)- (23) and (27)- (28) to verify that the claimed optimal strategy W 631 By Doob's optional sampling theorem, we can restrict attention w.l.o.g. to the set of feasible policies that implement the optimal policy stated in Theorem 1 after retirement. The utility function for such a strategy can be written as
By Lemma 3.3, M t is a supermartingale for any feasible policy c B R and a martingale for the claimed optimal policy c * B * * R * , which implies that M 0 ≥ E M t , i.e.,
with equality for the claimed optimal policy. In addition, by Lemma 3.3, we also have that lim t→ E 1−R t e − + t V W t y t ≥ 0 with equality for the claimed optimal policy. Therefore, taking the limit as t ↑ in (54), we have
with equality for the claimed optimal policy c * B * * R * This completes the proof. Theorem 2 provides essentially complete solutions because the solution for x 0 , given W 0 , requires only a one-dimensional monotone search to solve Equation (25) and, for , one only needs to solve Equation (23).
We next provide results on computing the market value of human capital at any point in time, which is useful for understanding much of the economics in the paper. Proposition 3.1. Consider the optimal policies stated in Theorems 3.1-3.2. After retirement, the market value of the human capital (i.e., the capitalized labor income) is zero. Before retirement, in Theorem 3.1, the market value of the human capital is H y t t = g t y t
where y t and g t are given in ( where the second equality follows from the fact that R s ≡ 1 for s > . For the cases with voluntary retirement, because there is no more labor income after retirement, the market value of human capital after retirement is zero. We next prove the claims for after retirement. Using the expressions of H and the dynamics of x t and y t , it can be verified that, for x t > x when = 1 and for x < x t <x when = 0, we have that the change in the market value of human capital plus the flow of labor income will be given by
The drift term in (56) is equal to zero after plugging in the expressions for H (if = 0, the additional local time term atx from applying the generalized Itô's lemma is also equal to zero because it can be verified that H x x y t = 0). This implies that because it can be easily verified that H x y = 0 Therefore, H as specified in Proposition 3.1 is indeed the market value of the future labor income. The following result shows that because of retirement flexibility, human capital may have a negative beta even when labor income correlates positively with market risk. Proposition 3.2. As an investor's financial wealth W increases, the investor's human capital H decreases in Problem 2. Furthermore, if y < / , then human capital has a negative beta measured relative to any locally mean-variance-efficient risky portfolio.
The following lemma is useful for the proof of Propositions 3.2 and 3.4.
Lemma 3.5. Suppose = 1, > 0, 1 > 0, 2 > 0, and 3 > 0. Then, (i)ˆ x is strictly decreasing and strictly convex.
(ii) x is strictly convex and x x ≤ 1/ 1 . (iii) ∀x ≥ 0, we have x ≥ˆ x and ∀x ≥ x, we have x x ≥ˆ x x (iv) Given (24), there exists a unique solution x 0 > 0 to (25). In addition, W * t defined in (28) satisfies the borrowing constraint (8) . INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
Proof of Lemma 3.5. (i) This follows from direct differentiation becauseˆ > 0 and b −1 < 0. (ii) First, because > 0, 1 > 0, 2 > 0, and 3 > 0, it is straightforward to use the definitions of + and − to show that
Then, the claimed results also follow from direct differentiation. (iii) This follows from a similar argument to that of part (ii) of Lemma 3.1. (iv) By part (i), part (ii), and x x =ˆ x x , x R is continuous and strictly increasing in x. By an inspection of (33) and (34), x x R takes on all values that are less than or equal to 1/ 1 . Because y 0 > 0, there exists a unique solution x 0 > 0 to (25) for each W 0 ≥ −y 0 / 1 . Also, because x x R ≤ 1/ 1 , (28) implies that W * t > − 1−R t y t / 1 ∀t ≥ 0 Proof of Proposition 3.2. First, as shown in Lemmas 3.1 and 3.5, the dual value function defined in Theorem 3.2 is convex and thus the wealth level W t defined in Theorem 2 decreases with the dual variable x t . By Proposition 3.1, differentiating the expression for human capital with respect to x t for the case = 1 yields that human capital is increasing in x t because − < 0. Therefore, human capital decreases with financial wealth W for = 1 in Problem 2. For = 0 in Problem 2, differentiating human capital H with respect to x, we have that, before retirement,
where the second equality follows from the expressions of A and B in Proposition 3.1 and the inequality follows from the fact that + > 1 > − and x <x. Thus, human capital decreases with financial wealth W also for = 0. Furthermore, because x = y − , if y < / , then, as the market risk Z t increases, x t decreases and therefore human capital decreases by (57), i.e., human capital has a negative beta.
The following result shows that retirement flexibility tends to increase stock investment.
Proposition 3.3. Suppose y = 0 and > r1. Then, the fraction of total wealth W +H invested in the risky asset in Problem 2 when = 1 is greater than that in Problem 1.
Proof. By Theorem 3.1, the fraction of total wealth W +H invested in the risky asset in Problem 1 is constantly equal to A retirement decision is critical for an investor's consumption and investment policies. The following proposition shows that the presence of the no-borrowing constraint tends to make an investor retire earlier.
Proposition 3.4. In Problem 2, the retirement wealth threshold for = 1 is higher than for = 0.
Proof. Let A − , A + , and x be defined as in Theorem 3.2. To make the exposition clear, we now make their dependence on explicit, i.e., using A − , A + , and x instead: 
because A − 0 < 0 and + > 0. Result (60) contradicts (59). This shows that we must have x 0 > x 1 . Because, at retirement, the financial wealth is equal to −y x x 1 for Problem 2 and because −y x x 1 = x −1/ , we must have that the financial wealth level W at retirement for = 1 is higher than for = 0. One measure that is useful for examining the life cycle investment policy is the expected time to retirement. The following proposition shows how to compute this measure.
Proposition 3.5. In Problem 2, suppose that an investor is not retired and that x − 4. Conclusion. We examine the impact of retirement flexibility and borrowing constraints against future labor income on optimal consumption and investment policies. We solve two alternative models almost explicitly (at least parametrically up to at most a constant) and provide verification theorems that are proved using a combination of the dual approach and an analysis of the boundary. In addition, we also obtain and prove some interesting comparative statics.
